EXHIBIT 2

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1
                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
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                      ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
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   ASSOCIATED RECOVERY, LLC,
                                  Case 1:15-cv-01723
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                 Plaintiff,
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                                    Alexandria, Virginia
          v.
                                   April 15, 2016
  JOHN DOES 1-44, et al.,
                                    10:36 a.m.
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                 Defendants.
                                    Pages 1 - 12
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         TRANSCRIPT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
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            BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANTHONY J. TRENGA
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              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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   APPEARANCES:
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   FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
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        REBECCA J. STEMPIEN COYLE, ESQUIRE
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        BRANDI M. BRENNER, ESQUIRE
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  FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
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       COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
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Rhonda F. Montgomery OCR-USDC/EDVA (703) 299-4599

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Honor. A lot of them, the information provided is
questionable. Addresses are incomplete or almost
clearly inaccurate and misleading. For the most parts,
 they have been completely silent in response.
          We also did not know the identities of --
other than from the WhoIs records, we did not know the
lidentities of these certain defendants prior to the
filing.
          THE COURT: How were they served?
          MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: We've been sending
 e-mail to the e-mail address listed in the WhoIs, as
well as postal mail to that same address. We also did
a service by publication pursuant to the court order.
          THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
          Anything else?
          MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: The only other thing the
plaintiff would bring up is that should these certain
defendants be transferred to Texas, we would just like
to be clear that each of the individual certain
defendants does understand and does stipulate to the
personal jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Texas
court to enter the relief.
          I understand it's a very overwhelming and
maybe jumbled situation, it seems, for defendants'
counsel based on the papers we've seen from them to
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date and the conversations we've had with them.
  understand they are all primarily in China, if not all
            It seems that there is one -- I think he's a
   defendant who is organizing or kind of acting as a
  point person for the remaining of the defendants.
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  would just like to be clear that it is not just that
  point person who is stipulating on behalf of all of the
  defendants, but that each individual defendant is
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  stipulating to the jurisdiction of Texas.
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             THE COURT:
                         That's what I understand.
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             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
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             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I think
  lit's worthwhile to clarify two points. First, as to
  Xiaofeng Lin, who is the owner of five of the domain
  names, he is actually on the face of one of the domain
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  name transfer agreements. He has consented to the
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  personal jurisdiction of Texas; thus, there's no in rem
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  jurisdiction over him here because there's in personam
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  jurisdiction in Texas.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: So the case against him
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   cannot stand.
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             As for the remaining domain names that I
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  represent, Your Honor, eight already in the Butcher
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case and then the other remaining ones, my clients have
stipulated that we will not challenge the jurisdiction
of the Northern District of Texas to order the domain
registrar in Virginia to transfer the domain names if
we do not prevail in Texas.
          THE COURT: On the merits.
          MS. BRZEZYNSKI: On the merits, yes.
          THE COURT:
                      Right.
          MS. BRZEZYNSKI: I must tell you, Your Honor:
That is a very, very big issue in the case and one
where -- the very beginning of my argument I was saying
there's one argument that goes to the heart of
plaintiff's case, and that's the assumption that the
domain name transfer agreements are invalid and that
the receivers on behalf of Novo Point had no right to
transfer those agreements. That is very, very much an
lissue which the Northern District of Texas has retained
exclusive jurisdiction over.
          In fact, if those domain name transfer
agreements were pursuant to the Northern District of
Texas and there's an order that says so and are, in
fact, valid, then Novo Point had nothing to transfer,
no asset to transfer to Associated Recovery at all,
Your Honor.
          THE COURT: I understand.
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albeit in the Eastern District of Texas, involving many of the same domain names as those at issue here.

The Court has also considered the plaintiff's arguments that this case should remain in this district by virtue of its in rem jurisdiction over the domain names. Without getting into whether plaintiff's claims, in fact, appropriately arise under the anticybersquatting statute, it appears in any event that there's no reason to think that personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained over these certain defendants who claim these domain names as evidenced by both plaintiff's claims in the Eastern District of Texas against certain of these certain defendants and also the certain defendants' stipulation that they consent to the jurisdiction of the Northern District of Texas for the purposes of providing any remedy with respect to the transfer of these domain names.

In that regard, the anticybersquatting act specifically contemplates that such claims will be asserted where there is personal jurisdiction as the preferred course reserving *in rem* jurisdiction for those cases where personal jurisdiction is not obtainable.

For these same reasons, the Court concludes that transfer under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) is appropriate.